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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis paper is to describe how a physical border affects the 
Human security of people living in the borderlands and to investigate how the 
theory of Zartman is compatible with Human security as described by Owens. The 
case described is the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) between Georgia and 
South Ossetia where Russian soldiers erect a fence in 2011. The study uses 
Zartman’s theory to describe the borderland. Based on the political nature and 
depth the situation in the borderland can be fitted into a model. This analysis will 
be done twice, before and after the fence. In each of the cases the situation will be 
analyzed through Owens definition of Human security and concept of regional 
relevance. Finally I conclude that the physical shape of the border is of secondary 
importance next to its political nature. I also conclude that Zartman’s and Owens 
definitions can be combined in a working analysis.  
   
Key words: ABL, Administrative Boundary Line, EUMM, Georgia, South 
Ossetia, Border, Borderland, Human Security, Zartman, Owens, Russia. 
Characters: 69 463 
  
Table of contents 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question ......................................................................... 3 
1.2 Limitations ......................................................................................................... 3 
2 Theory ...................................................................................................................... 5 
2.1 Multidisciplinary or Undisciplined .................................................................... 5 
2.2 Zartman’s Classification .................................................................................... 6 
2.3 Human Security .................................................................................................. 8 
3 Method ................................................................................................................... 10 
3.1 Case Study ........................................................................................................ 10 
3.2 Theory Testing ................................................................................................. 12 
3.3 External and Internal Validity .......................................................................... 12 
3.4 Operationalization ............................................................................................ 13 
3.4.1 Human Security ........................................................................................ 13 
3.5 Material ............................................................................................................ 14 
4 Old Point of Analysis ............................................................................................ 15 
4.1 The Pre-fence Situation in Northern Georgia................................................... 15 
4.2 Humans Security in this Situation .................................................................... 17 
4.2.1 Detentions ................................................................................................. 17 
4.2.2 IDP Situation ............................................................................................ 18 
4.2.3 Human Security Conclusion ..................................................................... 19 
5 New Point of Analysis ........................................................................................... 20 
5.1 Post-fence Situation in Northern Georgia ........................................................ 20 
5.2 Human Security in this Situation ..................................................................... 22 
5.2.1 IDP Situation ............................................................................................ 22 
5.2.2 Economical Threats .................................................................................. 23 
5.2.3 Human Security Conclusion ..................................................................... 25 
6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 26 
6.1 How did the fact that the ABL became a physical border affect Human 
security on the Georgian side? .................................................................................... 26 
6.2 How is Zartman’s theory compatible with Owens definition of Human 
security? ...................................................................................................................... 27 
  
6.3 Reflections on the Research Process ................................................................ 27 
7 List of References .................................................................................................. 28 
 
 
  1 
1 Introduction 
The total length of all the barriers between countries in the world today equals 
more than half of the equator (57%) and that’s more than there has ever been 
before.
1
 Half of all the barriers built after the Second World War was built post-
2000. Thus the number of barriers built is accelerating.
2
  
In the last 20 years or so, in the era of globalization and after the fall of the Berlin 
wall, the research on borders and boundaries have shifted its focus more on 
borders embedded in new spatialities. 
Borders can be mobile and concern boundaries between social, economic or 
cultural groups as well.
3
 But, as we can see from the facts stated above, the world 
is, contrary to globalization, becoming more afraid of the dangerous “other” and 
borders are strengthened around the world.
4
 Because of this, I believe that it is 
important to go back and examine the effects of the “old” research object –the 
physical borders in the shape of fences and walls.  
One example of these “old” objects in a modern context is the region between 
South Ossetia and Russia. After the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 the region of 
South Ossetia, heavily backed by Russia, declared itself independent. The state of 
South Ossetia was only recognized by Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and two 
other minor pacific island states. Possibly to mark out their new independent state 
South Ossetia declared the Administrative boundary line, or the ABL, closed. A 
few years later, Russian troops started to erect a fence along the ABL.  
Precisely when the process started is debated.
5
 But the fence is to stretch 350 
kilometer on the border between Georgia and South Ossetia. The most recent 
reports I have obtained, from June 2013, says that the barrier now stretches 
approximately 22-25 kilometers.
6
 Tension along the ABL is growing, mainly due 
to the fact that even though the fence is only partly finished, the Russian and 
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South Ossetian border patrols regards even the unmarked stretches as closed and 
implement their force on unintentional trespassers.
7
  
 
"It’s an extremely volatile situation. Freedom of movement is a huge issue, and detention 
cases are around five to six per week. It’s a crisis”  
– says Ann Vassen, spokesperson of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia.8 
 
Some sort of border already existed before the war, but it was almost unnoticed 
and not relevant in daily life. The Georgians and the South Ossetians were 
mingled and the division between them was not prominent.  
This case can also be considered extra relevant due to resent events in the 
Ukraine and what can be interpreted as Russia’s new ideology of expansion. 
Another situation where a questionable border needs to be marked out by a fence 
or a wall is not impossible to imagine in the close future.  
The physical border is one important part of this study, but as we can see, the 
other, perhaps even more important part is of course the borderland. Because 
without the borderland being affected, the shape and nature of the border would 
not be of any interest.  
A borderland is defined in many ways. The simplest description is as a 
geographical area in close proximity to the border. However, most scientific 
definitions stress the effects that borderlands have on people’s lives. This is also 
true of Zartman’s definition which I have chosen to follow. Zartman also adds that 
a borderland is defined as a periphery to the power center or between power 
centers.
9
  
Furthermore, most studies have a state centric viewpoint where the border and 
the borderlands are only analyzed in relation to the state and how it affects the 
state or other states. I believe that the situation on the new border between South 
Ossetia and Georgia is the story of a borderland itself and the aspects that should 
be analyzed are not only found in relation to the state, but in relation to the people 
of the borderlands. With this said, this study will view the borders from the 
periphery of the country and not from the center. In practice, this means that I am 
not interested in why the fence was built, I’m interested in how it affect the people 
on the ground. 
Recent scientific studies on how physical border affect people’s lives are rare 
and thus important to investigate. Combined with the fact that physical borders 
are becoming ever more common I believe it’s highly relevant to study the effects 
of physical borders on people in the borderlands. 
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1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
The purpose of this study is twofold. First I wish to describe what may happen to 
the security of the people living on one side of the border when that border 
suddenly becomes a physical obstacle. Secondly, the purpose of the study is to 
provide a well grounded case study on the Human Security aspect of physical 
borders as well as to test if Zartman’s theory is compatible with Owens definition 
of Human security. 
 
 How did the fact that the ABL became a physical border affect 
Human security on the Georgian side? 
 How is Zartman’s theory compatible with Owens definition of 
Human security? 
 
1.2 Limitations 
First of all I will not specifically investigate the effects of demarcation even 
though demarcation is an important part of this situation and the effects of the 
demarcation is a part of the Human security issues discussed.  
However, demarcation stands for the sudden appearance of a border where 
there did not use to be one, demarcation does not necessarily mean that the border 
affects the borderlands and the people living around it. Demarcation can simply 
be a new line on a map which is not implemented in reality or implemented on a 
very small scale. This study will focus more on the nature of the border and more 
specifically, the effects of fenced borders. 
It would also be interesting to compare the ABL on the Ossetian border to the 
AB the ABL in Abkhazia. This however would take up to much space and time 
which is way I have decided to only focus on the ABL between Georgia and 
South Ossetia. The study would also be uneven since the border to Abkhazia has 
not had the same development towards a physical border. 
My study will focus on the Georgian side because of the lack of reliable 
material on the situation in South Ossetia. I will however mention the situation in 
South Ossetia whenever I can find reliable facts to broaden the picture, although it 
is not part of my analysis. 
There are many problems in the borderlands in northern Georgia and I will 
mention quite a few. But because of the limited size of this thesis I have restricted 
the text to only cover the two main security threats. In this way I will have 
sufficient space to describe the threats in a little more detail without 
compromising the rest of the analysis. Security is itself a contested subject and 
could easily be the focus of this entire study. I have however chosen to use 
  4 
Human security as my way of determining the fences effect on people in the 
borderlands without delving into the vast security debats.  
Last but not least, I have been forced to minimize the amount of criticism 
directed at Zartman’s theory as well as the amount of comparison to other 
potential theories. I believe that I have left a sufficient amount. 
  5 
2 Theory 
2.1 Multidisciplinary or Undisciplined 
Borders create differences. They are always implemented in order to create “us” 
and “them” and have always done so, at least since the Westphalia system was 
introduced.
10
  This moment in time is often held forth as the birth of international 
borders, but at the time, this notion of borders had of course to do with national 
integrity and the concept of sovereignty. The broader concept of borders has 
probably always existed, but it took scholars until the early 1990’s to start 
examining these other dimensions of the creation of “us” and “them”.11 
The renewed interest in the effects of bordering did of course coincide with 
the fall of the Berlin wall and the creation of new states as a result of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. But more importantly, when the field started 
growing, it did so separately, in many different fields from Geography to 
Anthropology and Political Science.
12
  
According to David Newman, the problem with this broadening however, as is the 
case with many other theoretical schools which grows quickly, was that border 
studies became too diverse and could no longer speak the same language or agree 
upon a single set of recognizable parameters.
13
  
 
“Crossing the language barrier of the borders between academic disciplines and 
practitioners is often harder than the trans-boundary movement which is increasingly 
taking place across the borders between states and regions” 14 
 
As a result of this diversity in border studies, the concept of the borders as a 
process emerged.
15
 The idea is that in the process of bordering there are common 
features that are shared by all types of borders, physical and social. The most 
salient of these features is the fact that borders create differences in that they 
include some and exclude others.
16
 There have been many studies with borders 
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themselves as their main focus. But until recently there have been very few 
studies concerned with the nature of the land and the people who are divided by a 
political dividing line.
17
 A few studies have been made on this phenomenon since 
the importance of the borderlands as areas of intensive interaction between 
economical, cultural, and political systems has been discovered.
18
 
2.2 Zartman’s Classification  
I have chosen to use William Zartman’s analytical approach to investigate my 
case. The reason for this is that it mirrors the discipline and does something which 
other attempts at creating an overarching theoretical model has not managed. It 
does not shy from complexity. Instead, it accepts that the study of borders and 
borderlands is multifaceted and multidimensional and instead of trying to simplify 
reality, it creates an analytical tool which can handle the complexity.
19
 Of course, 
all theories are simplifications of reality, but there are levels of how simple the 
reality can be described. With this said, Zartman allows some measure of 
generalization. For example, his view of the nature of borderlands boils down to 
three founding conditions – borderlands are a population on the margins of power 
centers, intersected by a political boundary, living dynamic relations internally 
and externally from the power center. The main point however, is that these three 
conditions are constantly changing.
20
 
These conditions are founding concepts on which the analytical frame is built. 
First in his analysis, he recognizes that even if the border is a socially constructed, 
artificial entity, its physical nature can affect other non-physical values. Because 
of this he starts by defining the border itself. He does this by using two salient 
characteristics of borders – political nature and depth.21 
Political nature – refers to the borders connection to the center and how much 
force is used to sustain and guard the border. To exemplify with two extremes a 
border can be loosely demarcated and unadministered, or it can be closely 
guarded and run by a strong central authority, or somewhere in between.
22
 
Depth – refers to the differences between the two sides of the border. To once 
again exemplify with two extremes: A border can divide two areas with little 
difference in for example culture or religion. The border is simply and 
administrative line on a map and the inhabitants largely ignores the differences. 
This would be a shallow border. But, it could also run between two areas with big 
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differences concerning language or religion where the different identities are 
unmistakable. This would constitute a deep border.
23
 
To return to the overarching main point in Zartman’s conditions of 
borderlands: the situation is never static –it is constantly changing. But, before we 
continue to the dynamics of the change itself, I will present Zartman’s models. 
These models represent ideal types or stylized versions of the spatial reality of 
borderlands. They are like snapshots and exist only to determine change from one 
model to the other.
24
 
 
Black-and-White model refers to a sharp border between the two borderlands. The 
border can be formal or informal. The borderlands in themselves can be seen as 
outposts of their respective power centers. The difference between the people 
living on both sides is apparent. The difference is probably linked to some 
objective fact but the people’s conviction that the two sides are different is of 
much more consequence. Because of this the situation is hostile towards the other 
and there is little or no cross-border interaction.
25
 
 
Grey model refers to a situation which is, as mentioned, at the other end of the 
scale. Even if people in the borderlands are different than the other the differences 
don’t matter in relation to the border since the populations are completely 
intermingled. The border may exist but it’s permeated. The borderlands and the 
extensive cross-border interaction create a culture of its own.
26
 This type of 
extensive interaction is sometimes called hybridization which refers to a situation 
where mutual adaptation and negotiation is norm through daily contact. This does 
not necessarily mean that differences disappear but they do not need to be 
enclosed by borders.
27
 
 
Spotty, buffered and layered models are somewhere in between the two extremes. 
Spotted model refers to islands or enclaves separated from the other by internal 
borders. Difference is of some importance, especially for the “islanders” who will 
try to protect their integrity, but culture from the outside will penetrate since the 
borders are quite permeated.
28
 The buffered model is the one closes to the Black-
and-White model since it refers to a situation where a third culture or population 
is situated between the main populations to separate them, hence the name. The 
buffer zone could also refer to a hybrid zone. Layered model differs from the 
others because it concerns horizontal rather than vertical demarcation. One culture 
or population is dominant over another such as in a colonized society or in the 
Apartheid system in South Africa.  
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2.3 Human Security 
Human security started out as a way of broadening the security concept by 
challenging Realism.
29
 I will not dive too deep into the background of the Human 
security concept. I will however say that the concept has been criticized for being 
too broad. When talking about things that may threaten people the list can be 
made endless and the concept has thus been hard to define.
30
 There are a number 
of different examples of how one should or should not interpret Human security. 
And because Human Security is such a broad concept I have chosen to follow 
Taylor Owens definition of human security based on what he calls Severity 
relevance. This means that threats should not be included in Human Security just 
because they happen to fall within a certain category. Instead, Owens suggests 
that there should be a categorization of threats based on the severity of the threat 
and the policy response required. He divides this “hybrid” definition of Human 
Security into two parts and six categories. The first part is defined as “Human 
security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and 
pervasive threats.”31 
The advantage of this definition is, according to Owen, the possibility of 
keeping the broad aspect of Human security without confusing it with issues of 
human well-being and human development. Furthermore, by including “vital 
core” and “critical and pervasive threats” the definition includes only the most 
immediate and severe threats. The second part is a set of six categories and the 
remaining part of the hybrid definition: “Human security is the protection of the 
vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, 
food, health, personal and political threats.”32 
These categories are obviously based on the UNDP definition. However, the 
categories themselves are not threats as such. Instead they work as a conceptual 
grouping which simplifies the analysis.
33
 
I will also follow Owens associated concept of regional relevance. This is a 
way of measuring Human security and which provides some analytical clarity. 
One examples of how this can be done is to simply do what Owen calls a “laundry 
list” of threats where one picks threats randomly, or base the selection on data 
which would entail perfect information of all the potential threats. But instead he 
suggests a selection based on the threats relevance to the region. This improves 
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ones chances of gathering the relevant data as well as stay true to the broader 
interpretation of Human security.
34
 
I have chosen to use Owens definitions since it provides a focus on the 
security of people; it keeps the broad aspects of Human security as well as clearly 
restricts the number of threats defined as Human security. As such, this is 
plausible to adopt and use in a methodological context. 
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3 Method 
3.1 Case Study 
According to Robert K. Yin the optimal situation for conducting a case study is 
when the research question is based on “how” or “why”, when the study attempts 
to investigate a current set of events and when the researcher has little or no 
control over the events taking place.
35
  
Another reason for choosing a case study method is its ability to deal with a 
more diverse set of evidence which I believe is needed to get the full picture in 
this case.
36
  
I will use Zartman’s theory as my descriptive theory. By doing so I will not 
develop a theory of my own, instead I will be able to concentrate on the research 
question at hand. Zartman also provides the method with which his models are to 
be measured. In that way he provides us with an operationalization. I will also 
follow Zartman’s demand to include the changes in the borderland by doing two 
analysis, one before, and one after the fence was built. This is the main point of 
using Zartman’s theory in this study, to easily determine if there is a difference 
between the pre-fence and the post-fence situations by juxtaposing the models.  
Following these guidelines given by Zartman I will conduct the study as 
follows: 
I will start by analyzing the situation in the Georgian borderland before the 
fence was erected. By doing so I can quickly see which of Zartman’s models is 
the most appropriate to help explain the situation. I will do this by using political 
nature and depth as explained in the theory chapter. 
  When I have established which model is appropriate for the situation I will 
start investigating the human security in that situation. As mentioned in the 
theoretical discussion, Zartman’s theory is based on stylized models of reality and 
these models cannot be said to represent reality. He writes that these models are 
only gross simplifications of reality and they are not likely to fit. Instead they are 
to be seen as analytical tools, they represent what is typical for the case by 
highlighting salient properties in the phenomenon one wishes to analyze.
37
 This 
will in turn help me when I analyze the human security. 
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However, the models can only give me indications of a specific moment in 
time and borderlands are not static and can only be described in a state of constant 
change. To handle this, Zartman has identified three main dimensions from which 
an analysis can capture and describe that motion.
38
 
Time as the first dimension is quite straight forward. During what time span will 
the border be examined?
39
 
Space, as the second dimension, explains what spatial region you are interested in. 
It is also important to note that the analysis may vary depending on what area 
within a particular region you choose to focus on. The focus must thus be on the 
level which provides the best opportunity for understanding. A study of any 
borderland region will contain many different situations and components at the 
same time.
40
 
The time and space variables will be defined in the Operationalization chapter. 
The third variable concerns the activity or variable which is the focus of the 
analysis. In this case the variable is human security.  
To determine what human security means in this particular situation I will use 
Owens definitions and his methodological suggestions mentioned above. Based 
on his regional relevance-concept I will be able to determine what human security 
threats are most prominent.  
Depending on which activity one chooses to observe, there are three different 
layers that one can focus on according to Zartman. These are: 
The local level, the national level, the mythological layer which concerns the 
way in which the border is perceived.  
In this study, which focus on the Human security effects of a physical border, 
will view human security on the local level. Indeed, human security is in itself 
defined from a local level.  
When all this is done, I have a clear image of the situation before the fence 
was erected.  
I move on to when the fence is erected and I will do the same procedure here. 
Start by deciding which of Zartman’s models fit the situation the best. When I 
have these two situations I will be able to draw a conclusion if, and how, human 
security has changed by juxtaposing the pre-fence and post-fence borderlands. 
. This layup will insure that I follow Zartman’s demand for description in 
constant change since I follow the time, space and activity guidelines in both 
separate descriptions. Since the fence is the independent variable I may conclude 
that whatever change there is in human security it should have been caused by the 
fence. This sort of study would be called an embedded case study by Robert K. 
Yin since it contains many different sub-categories in the same case.
41
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3.2 Theory Testing 
This far, the method described above is what could be called a theory consuming 
study.
42
 But, my second research question allows me to move towards the more 
theory testing field.  
I will not do a specific theory testing study which would demand a more 
elaborate methodological undertaking and a lot more space. However, since I 
have the opportunity to combine two theories, which to my knowledge has not 
been used in the same analysis in any previous study, I am interested to see if they 
are compatible. The method to do this is quite straight forward. I will conduct the 
study as described in this chapter and afterwards I will take some time to discuss 
the result. This is not a main focus in this study, it is simply a way of taking the 
opportunity of perhaps furthering the field of border studies by combining a 
theory which describes borderlands and combining it with a definition of Human 
security. A combination which I believe has a lot of relevance as stated in the 
introduction. 
3.3 External and Internal Validity 
As this study is designed so far, it is clear that the study only attempts to  say 
something about the case at hand and makes no attempts to produce results that 
could be applied to other similar cases. 
I do not agree with the constant strive towards the generalization of results and 
the ability to draw general conclusions.
43
 One reason for this is that the demand 
for general conclusions could keep researchers from attempting to conduct studies 
that could otherwise turn out to be good case studies. Instead I believe that it’s 
important to conduct studies based on the researcher’s interests.44  
As long as the study has a high internal validity it can still be of use to other 
studies and policymakers as well. In this case, the study could give useful insight 
into the phenomenon of borders effects on human security in other cases even if 
this link is not presented in the study itself.
45
 External validity can also be 
achieved by the building block principle where other studies can add to the 
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development of Zartman’s theory and thus, or to the description of this case, and 
by a cumulative effect strengthen the external validity.
46
 
3.4 Operationalization 
The first thing I need to decide is which time span I’m interested in analyzing. 
Since the fence is my independent variable I need to focus my pre-fence analysis 
as close to the building of the fence as possible.  
In this way I minimize the number of variables which otherwise may interfere 
with the analysis and affect my conclusions. The moment in time that I have 
chosen to focus on is the years 2010 and early 2011. It’s after the war but before 
the fence. It was in May in 2011 that the first reports of a barbed wire fences 
along the ABL started to surface. By examining this moment in time the 
immediate effects of the war will have dialed down but I will still get a clear view 
of which effects the war had on human security. I will thus be able to discern the 
effects of the war from the effects of the fence later on. 
The geographical area which I am interested in is harder to decide since it is 
not a definition based on geography, but on how far the effects of the border can 
reach. But based on Zartman’s definition of Borderland, the things I am interested 
in analyzing is: Everything that is affected by the border but still in the periphery 
to the power center. 
 As long as the facts that I analyze adhere to these two guidelines it should 
give me enough precision to determine the effect of the fence. To guide my 
material collection I will look at the geographical area northern part of Georgia, in 
the vicinity of the border to South Ossetia. This is the region where I believe I will 
have the biggest chance of finding material which full fills the definition states 
above. 
 
3.4.1 Human Security 
Instead of making a list of potential human security threats, which could be 
ridiculously long, and then test all different threats on the situation at hand I will 
use Owens concept of regional relevance as well as data availability. Because of 
the limits in time and space which accompanies this thesis I will choose the two 
treats which are extra prominent in the borderland in the 2010 to early 2011 
period. In this way I will be able to describe them in some detail. (I will however 
mention other threats). The two main threats will be measured in both time 
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periods to see if they change. I will also do a new analysis of which threats are the 
most prominent in the later time period to see if other threats have emerged. The 
later time period will be the year 2013. 
3.5 Material 
In this study I will work with both primary and secondary sources. Reports from 
organizations and articles will make out the bulk of the sources from my 
theoretical descriptions and discussions.  
The trickier part is the post-fence analysis. This analysis is a lot more 
dependent on journalistic material.  
The question of using journalistic material forces me to be much more critical 
towards the sources. But, since I’m not able to travel to the region I have no 
choice but to rely on the material that’s available. To remain critical towards my 
empirical material I have chosen to use Teorell and Svensson’s so called critical 
criterion.  
These criteria consist of authenticity, evaluating if the facts are true or 
fabricated and if the provider of the information is who it says it is. Concurrency, 
concerns the distance in time between the creation of the article, or fact, and the 
actual event. Tendency, can the empirical fact reveal a tendency or lean towards a 
certain ideology or way of thinking?
47
 There are many different criteria 
concerning the evaluation of facts, but I believe that by using these three simple 
guidelines I will be able to conduct a study with high validity. 
I have also found documents and articles which I knew contained important 
information but which were in Russian or Georgian. I have not had the time or the 
ability to translate these documents and have thus been forced to keep my 
information gathering to English materials. 
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4 Old Point of Analysis 
4.1 The Pre-fence Situation in Northern Georgia 
The first step of my analysis is to determine which of Zartman’s models is the 
most appropriate. I will start by determining the political nature of the situation. 
Right after the war in 2008 the South Ossetian de facto authorities who took 
over the region closed the ABL. Still in 2010 and early 2011 the ABL was closed 
and the only legal way to enter South Ossetia was through Russia. The authorities 
treats the ABL as a state border. The same is more or less true in the opposite 
direction. South Ossetians are however, on paper, allowed to travel to the 
Georgian held territories provided they have the proper documentation. In 
practice, the situation is not that simple according to Crisis Group Europe. South 
Ossetians have a hard time crossing the border into Georgia. The only place where 
such a crossing is allowed is at the crossing in Akhalgori, and even then, the decision 
of whether someone is allowed to cross is up to the discretion of the local police. The 
difficult and the fear of detentions keep many South Ossetians from traveling to 
Georigia.
48 
Quite a substantial amount of force was being used by Russia to protect the 
ABL in 2010. Russian soldiers had taken over the control of the border from the 
South Ossetian troops and during 2010 an estimate of 900 Russian soldiers 
guarded the border. Twenty Russian border posts were constructed during 2010 
but they were not completed until 2011.
49
 Because of the extensive Russian 
presence in South Ossetia the South Ossetian de facto authorities disbanded a 
large part of the soldiers conscripted during the war.
50
 These facts point to the 
ABL being very much in the focus of at least the Russian power center in 2010 
and early 2011. 
The depth of the border is also important to determine which of Zartman’s 
models is appropriate. 
The differences between the people living on either side of the ABL were not 
that great before the war, even though there was a bigger population of ethnic 
Ossetians in South Ossetia (about two thirds) and one third Georgians. The 
situation on a people-to-people level was quite cordial.
51
 However, during and 
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after the war South Ossetian troops conducted what Human Rights Watch called 
an “ethnic cleansing of Georgians” of many villages in South Ossetia.52 This, 
“ethnic cleansing” and the 2008 war itself generated a lot of IDP:s (Internally 
displaced people). UNHCR estimated in November 2009 that about 220 000 
people lived displaced in Georgian territories and about 10 000 people lived 
displaced in South Ossetia. On top of this, about 106 000 people lived in IDP-like 
situations in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and the areas in close proximity to South 
Ossetia.
53
  
In this displacement people fled to the areas they felt most connected to which 
brought a polarization of the demographical situation in South Ossetia and 
Northern Georgia. Still, a lot of family ties and former economical connections 
still existed across the border but the lack of freedom of movement made it hard 
to re-establish these links. 
To sum up this description of political nature and depth in the borderland of 
South Ossetia and Georgia I would say that the political nature points to a border 
closely guarded by both sides. One part in the conflict sees the ABL as a state 
border and freedom of movement is restricted by both sides. The large number of 
troops from Russia on the South Ossetian side points to a large interest from at 
least the Russian power center. The restricted movement from the Georgian side 
is not as strict but the situation on the ground is quite different. However, I believe 
that it should be safe to say that the border situation is of interest for the Georgian 
power center as well, even though they have a more relaxed approach on paper. 
Even though South Ossetia and Georgia had always been differentiated on a 
political level, in the power centers, since the South Ossetian declaration of 
independence right after the collapse of the Soviet union, the situation in the 
periphery, in the borderland, were much more pragmatic. The depth of the border 
land was greatly changed by the war. People fleeing the war and South Ossetian 
troops conducting ethnic cleansing contributed to the situation in 2010 which 
displays a much deeper separation. 
All this convinces me that the border situation between South Ossetia and 
Georgia in 2010 should be labeled as a Black-and-White border with a formal, but 
not physical border according to Zartman’s model.54  
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4.2 Humans Security in this Situation 
To determine the human security in this pre-fence situation I will, as mentioned 
earlier, use Owens definition. Which three threats are most prominent in this 
definition? 
4.2.1 Detentions 
Due to the situation in the borderland being of the Black and white model the 
ABL is guarded very closely, even though it’s not a physical barrier in 2010 and 
early 2011. This means that the restricted freedom of movement is a big issue in 
the area. However, the lack of freedom of movement, even though it has regional 
relevance, is not a human security issue according to Owens. The issue is not a 
“critical and pervasive threat” to the “vital core of human lives”. 
But the detentions can be, and they would fall under the category of “personal 
threats”. Since the war ended and the borderland situation took on a Black and 
white appearance there have been many arrests and detentions. Crisis Group 
Europe reports that in 2009 and 2010 there were as many as 5-10 detentions per 
day and they estimate that at least 100-200 people risk detentions each day by 
crossing the ABL. (People crossing the ABL at Akhalgori, as the only legal crossing 
point, are not included in this number). Some people do it unintentionally, and for 
some it is a calculated risk to attend cattle, check on property of visit funerals or 
family.
55
 These arrests are done by both Georgian and South Ossetian border 
guards. Most detentions end quite quickly, but some can last for months and 
become a sort of hostage situation
56
 
Through interviews done by Human Rights Watch the situation for the 
Georgian detainees in South Ossetian prisons was described as terrible. Right after 
the war the detainees were forced into crowded basement cells and subjected to 
degrading treatments such as being stripped naked. The poor conditions of their 
captivity, which entailed lack of water, food and electricity, were largely due to 
the war. Prisoners were however also subjected to frequent beatings.
57
 The 
Ossetian prisoners in Georgian prisons were also beaten and ill treated during and 
right after the war.
58
 However, the situation, at least in the Georgian prisons, is 
said to have gotten better in 2010, it is hard to say how the situation is in the 
South Ossetian prisons.
59
 Even though this is a direct threat to people’s lives it is 
not that serious that being arrested leads directly to death. It is however a potential 
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threat, partly because of the potential risks of a direct affect on people’s survival 
and partly because of the number of people that frequently cross the border. This, 
in my opinion, constitutes a personal human security threat based on the relevance 
in this region. 
4.2.2 IDP Situation 
Seen to the situation in the region in 2010 and early 2011, another important 
issue is the situation of the IDP:s or internally displaced people’s. In 2010 
Amnesty international estimated that at least 26, 000 people were still displaced 
because of the war. Most of them were Georgian and were unable to return to 
their homes because of the border situation.
60
 About 10, 000 people were 
displaced within South Ossetia in 2010 which are the latest figures available.
61
 
In 2010 the Georgian government adopted a strategy of not trying or forcing 
IDP:s to return to their place of origin which improved their situation. A lot of 
people were able to move in to 38, more or less, temporary settlements.
62
 Still, 
many others lived in unofficial collective centers and some live in privately 
arranged dwellings. The living conditions in these places are inadequate according 
to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. These places does not meet the 
minimum required sheltering standards and they are very cramped since one or 
more families often share the same room. Many families also share bathrooms 
which are very unsanitary.
63
 These centers are also located in areas that are 
isolated. There are no public transportation in these areas and the IDP:s are 
generally to economically challenged to own any kind of transportation of their 
own. This leads to poor access to schools, jobs and first and foremost, health care. 
Ossetian living in on the South Ossetian side of the ABL are at the same time 
very skeptical to Georgian IDP:s returning to their former homes. According to 
Crisis Group Europe the Ossetians say that inter-ethnic tension was one of the 
reasons behind the Russo-Georgian war in the first place. They also believe that if 
Georgians were to return the Georgian government would embed special forces 
soldiers with the civilians who returned.
64
 
All these conditions could fall under the human security categories of 
economic and health threats as described by Owens. This is also a typical example 
of a situation that was brought on by the war but the new Black and white 
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borderland situation makes matters worse by not allowing people to return to their 
original homes forcing them to live in hopeless conditions. 
4.2.3 Human Security Conclusion 
On the whole none of the issues mentioned above is, in my opinion, enough to full 
fill Owens definitions of human security because of the lack of severity, even 
though the threats attack the vital core. However, the concept of regional 
relevance and the categories put forth by Owens helps me to identify the most 
pressing issues in the borderland in 2010 and early 2011, even though the severity 
may not reach up to Owens definition. 
  20 
5 New Point of Analysis 
5.1 Post-fence Situation in Northern Georgia 
Now that we have moved on to the post-fence situation, which is the year of 2013, 
I will conduct the analysis in the same way as in the pre-fence analysis. I will start 
by determining which of Zartman’s models is the most appropriate to describe the 
post fence situation. The first step is once again political nature. 
Reports of the ABL being marked out with the use of barbed wire had been 
around since the spring of 2011. The work seems to have stopped since there were 
no more reports until may 2013 when Russian forces started to erect a real fence 
in the vicinity of the village of Ditsi a few miles north of Gori. The local people 
complained that they were no longer able to reach their agricultural land or water 
sources.
65
 According to the EUMM:s IPRM-meetings the tension seems to be 
rising in the borderland. Among other issues the even more frequent detention of 
trespassers as well as Georgian police cars near fatal confrontation with Russian 
border guards were discussed.
66
 Apart from barbed wire the fence also included 
earth berms and ditches as well as high-tech surveillance cameras.
67
 The Russians 
even expanded the South Ossetian territory in some places by building the fence 
on stretches of land that are clearly Georgian and they explain it by referring to 
Soviet maps and boundaries.
68
 The rules prohibiting people from South Ossetia 
and Georgia to travel in to each other’s regions still apply and have even become 
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more restrictive since the building of the fence started.
69
 On the 8 of august 2013, 
precisely five years after the war, the fence stretched for 27 kilometer and crossed 
through and around 15 villages.
70
 
The fence itself is not erected on the ABL. The stretch of the fence is, 
according to Russian sources, based on a Soviet map of the region from 1922. 
This has lead Georgian media to dub the borderization a “creeping occupation” 
since the occupied area is slowly expanding as the fence is erected.
71
 I do not have 
enough secure sources, or neutral sources, to determine if this is part of the 
Russian agenda or if this is the case along the entire ABL. According to one 
source the ABL is about 15 meters in front of the fence which means that if you 
walk up to the fence, you have already crossed the line and are liable for arrest.
72
 
Although it seems to be clear that the fence is not drawn precisely along the ABL 
since there are many reports of people and settlements being affected by the fence 
that were not necessarily affected by the ABL. 
All this seems to indicate that the border is as closed as it was in 2010 if not 
even more. Thus, the amount of money spent on the installation of the fence the 
borderization of South Ossetia must be very much in the focus of the Russian 
power center.  
The depth of the borderlands has not changed since 2010. The situation is still 
polarized due to the forced displacement of Georgians out of South Ossetia. The 
people living displaced in Georgia proper have still not been able to return 
because the de facto authorities in South Ossetia do not allow it. They are afraid 
that the sudden influx of Georgians would upset the ethnic balance in South 
Ossetia and thus risk renewed conflicts.
73
 
To sum up the post-fence situation in the borderlands the situation is in large 
parts the same as the pre-fence situation, only worse. The Depth has not changed a 
lot. The demographic polarization happened right after the war 2008 and the 
situation remains unchanged. The political nature on the other hand has grown 
even tenser in 2013. The power centers spend more money trying to control the 
ABL and detentions are even more frequent. Through this I conclude that the 
situation still falls into Zartman’s black-and-white model. This means that there 
has been no great change in the situation from the pre-fence to the post-fence 
situation, except for the construction of the fence in some areas. 
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5.2 Human Security in this Situation 
When examining the human security situation in 2013 it’s important to decide if 
the faults in the human security are derived from the fence or from other causes. 
In some instances it is possible that the faults in the human security can be traced 
to causes which are common to both the fence and (for example) the war of 2008.  
Just as in the pre-fence analysis I will use Owens definition of human security 
as well as his concept of regional relevance to determine which human security 
threats are most prominent. To follow up the situation of the detainees which 
qualified as a personal threat in 2010 and early 2011, the situation has improved a 
lot. The ICRC has hardly anything to criticize in their 2013 Annual Report about 
the situation of the detainees. 15 of the prisons in Georgia visited by the ICRC had 
improved their healthcare and there is no mention of further abuse.
74
 
The ICRC does not mention the situation in the borderlands in particular but 
they do say that one of the more common crimes that people are detained for is 
illegal crossing of the ABL, thus one can assume that the improvements in the 
detention centers also apply for those places located in the borderlands. In South 
Ossetia the ICRC reports that especially the hygiene, as well as the health care has 
improved a lot.
75
 To summarize the detainee situation I would not consider it a 
personal security threat, as was the case in the pre-fence situation.  
Apart from the once that I have mentioned there could also be a health threat 
related to the fence. Some more severe medical cases that were untreatable in 
South Ossetia had to be evacuated across the ABL into Georgia.  
These evacuations were managed by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) as the only neutral intermediary accepted on the South Ossetian 
side.
76
 But since these medical emergencies are relatively few in comparison to 
the number of people living in the borderlands I do not believe that the fact 
qualifies as a human security threat. It does however show that the freedom of 
movement can induce other potential human security threats. 
5.2.1 IDP Situation 
Still in 2013 none of the IDP:s have been able to return home because of the 
relationship between South Ossetia/Russia and Geogia which in turn is 
crystallized in the ABL.  
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Some of the IDP:s left the collective centers and tried to return but were not 
able to cross the ABL. Instead, they settled on the Georgian side of the ABL but 
as close as possible to their old home. She situation of these people have been 
made worse by the installation of the fence since it physically prevents them from 
accessing land, homes, other livelihood and water. According to the Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Center, the people who live close to the ABL, as 
described above, fell very unsafe because of this despite the presence of Georgian 
border guards.77 
The situation have improved for the IDP:s who stayed in the government 
owned collective centers since 2010. After five years of not being able to relocate 
the IDP:s to their original homes the Georgian government realized that they need 
to integrate the IDP:s into their society. This policy has been carried out with 
mixed results. The IDP:s who stayed also face threats on a daily basis.
78
  
More IDP:s are able to live in their own houses or apartments than two years 
before. However, their main income is still the government’s monthly allowance 
which places the IDP:s economically on the same level as other poor people in 
Georgia. 
79
 
Despite the policy that IDP:s relocated from collective center are to be able to 
chose their own housing, the real situation does not allow this. Usually the 
families that move to own housing arranges by the government does not have a 
choice in location, standard or other special needs. Thus, most IDP:s, even in own 
housing, does not live in places which supports their livelihood or needs. 
Furthermore, these arranged houses are, as mentioned in the pre-fence analysis, 
isolated, geographically and by means of public transport. And just as the IDP-
situation in the pre-fence analysis the biggest threats are the poor economic 
situation as well as poor housing. The poor housing situation can in turn be 
described as a health threat.
80 
5.2.2 Economical Threats 
It is not only the IDP:s who relocated to the vicinity of the ABL who were 
affected when the fence was built. Other people living in the borderland, and in 
some cases on the border, were also affected. 
In august 2013 the EUMM voiced concerns that the “physical obstacle” had a 
growing impact in the freedom of movement and the livelihoods of the local 
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communities. They also stated that it disrupts patterns of life of the local 
population and divides communities”.81 
Many of the negative effects of the fence were sentimental such as being cut 
off from family, friends or cemeteries. Even though it’s sad, it does not have the 
potential of threatening people’s lives and does not qualify as a threat to the 
human security. On the other hand, the economical effect of the fence does 
threaten people’s lives. 
The most severe consequence is that people live on one side of the border and 
their farmlands, or part of their farmlands, end up on the other side of the fence. 
One such case is described in The Guardian where Tina Bidzinashvili and her 
husband’s apple orchard is suddenly demarcated from their farm as Russian 
soldiers draw barbed wire across it. The apple orchard is their only economical 
income. Their only chance of legally getting in to South Ossetia is by hopefully 
being allowed to cross a checkpoint. The checkpoint is however six hours away.
82
 
Another such story is that of Georgian farmer Georgi Chatlitschvi.  
 
"The Russian border guards told me my orchards were no longer mine—they were 
part of South Ossetia, not Georgia. Those apples were my livelihood. Now they sit behind 
the fence, on land they tell me is part of a different country."
83
 
 
Other such stories describe people dependent on the cattle industry. If cattle, while 
grazing, happen to wander off to the wrong side of the ABL they are confiscated. 
If the herders try to retrieve the cattle, they themselves may are arrested for 
trespassing.
84
 These issues have been discussed at EUMM:s IPRM-meetings and 
observers have tried to work out solutions where farmers will be able to get to 
their lands without the risk of arrest. In the earlier IPRM-meetings of 2014 no deal 
had been struck. Apart from this issue, other fence related issues discussed at the 
meetings are the water supply which in some villages is also cut off.
85
 Without 
access to the full protocols from the meeting it is however unclear if the EU-
monitors managed to solve the problem. Another issue which would fall under the 
economic security threat is the pension which elderly Georgians are entitled to. 
Some old Georgians are however on the South Ossetian side of the ABL which 
means that they need to travel to an authorized crossing and then to a government 
facility of some kind to collect their pension. Unfortunately, the pension is paid in 
Georgian Lira which, on their return to South Ossetia, is worthless since the 
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Russian Ruble is the only accepted currency in the de facto state.
86
 This makes the 
situation of the elderly even worse, and they are already one of the most exposed 
groups.
87
 
5.2.3 Human Security Conclusion 
Based on the examples mentioned above and on the more overarching statements 
made by the EUMM and the ICRC I conclude that the situation is not positive.  
The big difference in this analysis compared to the first one is that the 
situation has certainly changed. The most pressing issues are not the same after 
the fence as they were before except for the still very pressing IDP-situation. On 
the whole I draw the same conclusion as in the pre-fence analysis. The regional 
relevance concept help me to pinpoint the most pressing human security issues 
even if they are not as severe as the once I believe Owens had in mind when he 
created his definition of human security. 
There are many issues that are brought on by the closed nature of the ABL and 
by the fence. These two are important to separate since I am interested in 
analyzing the effects of the physical nature of the border, that is to say the fence. 
To follow this train of thought I believe that the human security threats created by 
the fence, in the post-fence situation these would be the economic threats from 
people being cut off from their livelihood, are not as severe as the ones created by 
the closed nature of the ABL.  
Another threat that accompanies a physical barrier in a former conflict area is 
that the fence or wall prevents people-to-people contact which is an important 
thing for reconciliation and to build confidence between former enemies. On the 
other hand, this is no Human security threat. 
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 VICE News, 27-02-2014. 
87 ICRC, Georgia/South Ossetia: life on both sides of the administrative boundary line, 2009, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/feature/2009/georgia-feature-060809.htm. 
[Retrived:16-08-2014]. 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 How did the fact that the ABL became a physical 
border affect Human security on the Georgian side? 
Finally I draw my conclusions. I have chosen to save many of my conclusions till 
this last part. The reason is that I believe that if the conclusion is allowed to take 
up some space the reasoning can be more nuanced and precise. It is easier to 
follow logical reasoning if it can be read in one flow instead of being spread out 
piece meal over thirty pages. I will however summarize my final conclusion in the 
end. 
I cannot say anything about other cases, but I believe that I can say that the 
situation in the borderland did not change drastically after the border transformed 
from a controlled border to a physical barrier. This leads me to draw the 
conclusion that the human security, in the case of the borderland in northern 
Georgia, does not depend on the physical state of the border.  
Just as a border may just be a line on a map a fence can just as well be just a 
fence. Thus, the decisive issue is in not in the physical dimensions of the border 
but rather what Zartman calls political nature and depth, in this case the closed 
nature of the ABL. The whole borderland may be affected by the border being 
closed but the whole borderland is not necessarily affected by the fence itself.  
There were differences in the Human security situation. In the pre-fence 
situation the main threats were the economical and health threats of the IDP:s 
situation. This situation is partly caused by the war and partly by the closed nature 
of the ABL which prevents them from returning. This situation continues into the 
post-fence situation, but the causes are the same. The addition of a fence does not 
add to the misery of the IDP:s. The other main Human security threat in the post-
fence situation was the loss of livelihood in the borderland caused by people being 
cut off from their farmland and orchards and this is a direct effect of the new 
physical nature of the ABL. It did however only afflicts people who lived in the 
shadow of the fence. 
To summarize my conclusion, I conclude that the fence, as a physical entity, is 
not of great importance. It is instead the nature of the border that is the cause of 
the more severe and wide spread threats. The physical nature of the fence only 
affects the people who live in its shadow. 
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6.2 How is Zartman’s theory compatible with Owens 
definition of Human security? 
I believe that the activity in Zartman’s time/space/activity concept is not meant to 
be something as large as Human security. The activity should be something which 
in itself does not entail as many sub-categories.  
An example would be to only investigate the IDP situation in the borderland. I 
believe that this would be a lot easier for Zartman’s theory and methodological 
considerations.. However, Zartman’s theory is compatible with Owens definition 
of Human security due to this addition of activity. The concept allows for a lot of 
freedom without losing track of the importance of the time and space definitions 
or of the the local level, the national level or the mythological layer, even if all of 
these levels are not relevant in every study. I also believe that one should not pick 
and chose from Zartman’s theory but use the whole theory. 
6.3 Reflections on the Research Process 
The research process for this thesis paper was quite honest in the sense that I 
started by determining which theories would be most appropriate to answer my 
research question.  
Not until I had decided this did I fully confront the empirical material. Later 
on I discovered that based on the empirical evidence I could have refined the 
theoretical part of the study to fit the empirical evidence. I did not do this which 
leads me to my conclusion that the study is in this sense honest and has a decent 
measure of internal validity. 
The issue of collecting reliable information is hard when the study is about the 
situation of people on the ground and their daily life. Thus, if I had the 
opportunity to conduct this study again I would complement my material by doing 
interviews. While working on this study I have come to realize that the only, and 
beast way to get reliable facts when studying people is to talk to them, or at least 
talk to the people who work in close contact with them, such as the EUMM in this 
case. 
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